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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the court below correctly held that the Rylands v.
Fletcher rule of strict liability does not apply to Lincoln's
maintenance of personal financial information in a
computer.
2. Whether the court below correctly held that the maintenance of personal financial information in a computer is not
an ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity.
3. Whether the court below erred in holding that a recordkeeper, such as a bank, has a duty to its customers to hold
financial records regarding its customers in confidence.
4. Whether, if such a duty is found to exist, the court below
erred in holding that Lincoln breached this duty by making
disclosure to the State of Marshall Securities Commission
pursuant to an informal request of the Commission.
5. Whether the court below erred in holding that, due to the
state of the art of computer technology and the difficulty of
proving a breach, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor should apply in establishing the negligence of Lincoln regarding disclosure of personal information stored in a computer.
6. Whether the court below erred in denying Lincoln's motion
to dismiss Count II of Duffy's complaint regarding negligent
±i
disclosure of personal information through a computer.I
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion and judgement of the Circuit Court for the
County of Lincoln, State of Marshall was rendered and entered
on February 12, 1982. Duffy v. Lincoln County State Bank Corporation, No. 81-101 (Cty. Lincoln 1982). The Appellate Court of
the State of Marshall entered its opinion and judgment on December 3, 1982. The Appellate Court of the State of Marshall entered its opinion and judgment on December 3, 1982. Lincoln
County State Bank Corporationv. Duffy, No. 82-999 (Marshall

1982).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this action the plaintiff William Duffy (Duffy) has appealed and the defendant Lincoln County State Bank Corporation (Lincoln) has cross-appealed from a decision of the
Appellate Court for the State of Marshall. The Appellate Court
reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded a decision of the
Lincoln County Circuit Court denying Lincoln's Motion to dismiss both counts of Duffy's complaint.
The facts which gave rise to this action are as follows. Duffy
is a controlling shareholder of Baker Properties, Inc. (Baker), a
publicly held corporation chartered under the laws of the State
of Marshall. (R. 1). Nancy Barnes (Barnes), in her capacity as
an attorney in the offices of the State of Marshall Securities
Commission (Commission), investigated Duffy's purchase of
the controlling interest in Baker in 1976. (R. 2). On March 26,
1981, a newspaper article concerning a plan by Baker's to reor11 ganize caused the Commission to begin ani investigation into
Baker with Barnes as chief investigator. (R. 2). In the course of
her investigation, Barnes wrote to banks operating in Lincoln
County requesting information as to whether Duffy, Baker or
any other known Baker shareholders maintained accounts at
these banks. (R. 2).
The defendant Lincoln was one of the banks which received
Barnes' informal request. (R. 2). A Lincoln executive informed
Barnes that Duffy was a Lincoln customer, and at Barnes' informal request agreed to send Barnes a list of Duffy's personal account types and numbers. (R. 14). Although it is agreed that a
correct search instruction was entered into Lincoln's computer,
the system instead caused complete information detailing transactions from Duffy's personal accounts from January 15, 1981 to
April 15, 1981 and other personal information to be automatically
sent to Barnes. (R. 14).
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Upon receipt of this information, Barnes noticed a $75,000.00
electronic fund transfer into Duffy's personal account from a
Baker account in the First State Bank of Marshall recorded on
January 20, 1981. (R. 2). The Commission then requested further information from Lincoln under a subpoena which Lincoln
complied with. (R. 14). Uneasy about the investigation, Lincoln
on June 11, 1981 cancelled a $150,000.00 line of credit which had
been extended to Duffy in 1980. (R. 2, 14). Duffy alleges that, as
a result, he was unable to exercise an option he held to purchase
land for $140,000.00 until June 15, 1981 and that the day after the
option had expired, a third party bought the land forL 12
$220,000.00. (R. 3). Later the Commission ended its investigation having found no impropriety on Duffy's part, and the Commission returned to Duffy his bank records. (R.14).
Thereafter, Duffy filed a two count complaint in the Circuit
Court for the County of Lincoln. (R. 14). Count I alleges that
Lincoln's use of a computer to maintain its customers' personal
financial information is an ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity and that Lincoln is strictly liable for any harm
flowing from such use. (R. 3). Duffy alleges that he was harmed
by virtue of his inability to exercise his land purchase option
and that he suffered severe emotional distress. (R. 4). Under
this count, Duffy seeks damages against Lincoln of $80,000.00 for
pecuniary loss and $750,000.00 for mental and emotional stress,
plus attorney's fees and costs. (R. 4). Count II of Duffy's complaint alleges negligent disclosure of personal information
which invaded Duffy's privacy rights and expectations of confidentiality in personal information. (R. 5). Duffy seeks the same
damages in Count II as in Count I. (R. 5).
Lincoln fied a Motion to Dismiss Duffy's complaint, arguing
that the State of Marshall does not recognize the use of computers to process information as an ultra-hazardous activity, and
further that such use is not an ultra-hazardous activity since;
(1) it is an activity commonly used in both the private and public sectors; (2) the use of computers to process information is
necessary and valuable to society and that the value outweighs
any possible harm a computer could cause by inadvertently releasing personal information; and, (3), it isi necessary in order 13
for a bank to effect its business and that as such, a computer is
appropriately utilized for this purpose. (R. 6-7).
Lincoln further argued that Count II should be dismissed
since the State of Marshall does not recognize a common law
duty of a bank to protect customer records and no contract existed between Duffy and Lincoln relative to this duty. (R. 7).
Lincoln also argued that even if a duty was found to apply, Duffy
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had failed to allege sufficient facts constituting a breach of duty
and that res ipsa loquitor did not apply. (R. 7).
Duffy filed a Response in Opposition to Lincoln's Motion to
Dismiss, arguing that public policy required the adoption of
strict liability for harm caused by computers used to process
personal financial information and that public policy also required the adoption of a common law duty of confidentiality on
the part of the bank. (R. 9).
The Circuit Court for the County of Lincoln denied Lincoln's Motion to Dismiss in a Memorandum Order by Judge G.
B. Watkins dated February 12, 1982. (R. 10). The court, faced
with two questions of law in a case of first impression, found;
(1) that under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, strict liability
should apply for public policy reasons against record-keepers
who keep large quantities of sensitive, personal financial information in computer data banks; and, (2) that implicit in the imposition of strict liability is recognition of a bank's duty to its
customers to act with care in maintaining this information. (R.
1411-12). The court furtheri determined that there existed substantial ground for difference of opinion on the questions of law
and that therefore an immediate appeal would advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. (R. 12).
The Appellate Court of the State of Marshall, Mink, Barry
and Johnston, J. J. affirmed in part and reversed in part the denial of Lincoln's motions to dismiss by the court below and remanded the case in an opinion by Chief Judge Mink dated
December 3, 1982. (R. 13). The court reversed the decision below denying the Motion to Dismiss as to Count I, reasoning, that
as a matter of public policy, strict liability would place an unreasonable burden on record-keepers, impair the flow of information and have a deleterious effect on commerce. (R. 15). The
court, therefore, held that the use of a computer to maintain personal financial information was not an ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity. (R. 15). The court affirmed the Circuit
Courts' denial of Lincoln's motion to discuss as to Count II,
holding that a bank has a duty to its customers to act with care
in maintaining sensitive personal financial information concerning them. (R. 15). The court held further that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor should apply in order to establish negligent disclosure of personal information through a computer, that Duffy's
complaint would be sufficient if he alleged control by Lincoln
over the instrumentality of the disclosure, and that but for Lincoln's negligence, this disclosure would not have occurred. (R.
16).
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On April 15, 1983, this Court entered an Order Granting
Leave to Appeal on Duffy's Petition for Leave to Appeal and Lincoln's Petition for Leave to Cross-Appeal.L
1-5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The rule of strict liability enunciated in Rylands v. Fletcher
and its progeny is a doctrine with definite limitations on its
scope of application. These limitations stem directly from the
factual circumstances in which the doctrine was originally conceived and applied. The paradigm case in which Rylands strict
liability has been applied involves a defendant's dangerous and
inappropriate use of land which causes physical harm to an adjoining landowner in obedience to natural, physical laws. Even
where there have been some slight variations from this paradigm, courts have uniformly required the elements of physical
harm to a person or property which occurs because of the close
geographic relationship between that person and defendant's
activity, before such strict liability has been imposed.
The present case does not involve any physical harm to
Duffy, nor is the harm occassioned by the geographic proximity
of Lincoln's activity to Duffy. Indeed, Lincoln's activity of computer maintainence of personal financial information cannot
physically harm bank customers, and any geographic relationship between Duffy and Lincoln's activity is irrelevant to any
risk created. This court should reject such a revoluntionary expansion of Rylands strict liability as courts have consistently
doen in the past.
Moreover, the application of strict liability is not justified
under the original rule of Rylands v. Fletcher since the use of
computers in storing financial or other personal information is
not abnormal or inappropriate to the place whereL it is main- -6
tained. This is true whether this court conceives of the "place
where it is maintained" as the State of Marshall, the community
of financial institutions, or the national community as a whole.
Similarly, the Restatement of Torts, §§ 519, 520, do not allow application of strict liability to the present case, since Lincoln's activity is not ultra-hazardous, for it does not involve an extreme
danger to others, nor is it clear that the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of due care.
Lincoln's use of a computer to maintain personal financial
information also cannot be deemed abnormally dangerous and
therefore strict liability cannot attach to this activity under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 519, 520. Section 520 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth several factors which
must be considered in determining whether an activity is abnor-
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mally dangerous. In this case these factors are not present,
since: (1) there does not exist a high degree of risk of harm to
the person, land, or chattels of another, and no risk of any physical harm resulting from Lincoln's use of a computer; (2) the likelihood of serious harm resulting from this slight risk is minimal;
(3) it may be possible to eliminate any risk that exists; (4) the
use of a computer to process customer information is a common
usage, appropriate to a bank; and, (5) the value to the community of Lincoln's computerized information processing far out17 weighs any dangerous attributes.I
Important public policy considerations strongly militate
against the imposition of strict liability in the present case.
Computer maintainence of large amounts of personalized information is a socially beneficial activity upon which the prosperity
of the financial community and, to an increasing extent, our society, depend. The application of strict liability to this activity
would place an unreasonable burden on all those engaged in
computer maintainence of personal information, a burden many
smaller entities and businesses would be unable to bear. Moreover, Rylands strict liability is applied to only the most dangerous activities. Any evaluation of the harms caused by such
computer uses, and the balancing of the relevant economic consequences such liability would occassion, should be left to the
legislature which is better equipped to handle such policy
resolutions.
In addition, there are numerous aspects of the present case
which compel the conclusion that strict liability should not be
applied in the present case. First, it is possible to eliminate a
substantial degree of the risk by the exercise of the utmost care
in engineering, programming and maintaining the computer.
Also, appellant faces no evidentiary problems in proving appellee's negligence. Finally, Duffy voluntarily encountered Lincoln's activity with full knowledge of the concomitant risks and
his harm was brought about by the intentional intervention of a
third party.
The Appellate Court was incorrect in concluding that a bank
should be under a duty to keep financial information about its
18 customers in confidence. Any expectation of privacy or confidentiality which a customer, such as Duffy, has in his financial
records is forfeited when he discloses the information to a third
party, the bank in the course of his bank transactions. Any
check, financial statements and deposit slips contain information voluntarily given to the bank and are the business records
of the bank and not the private papers or property of the customer. Having revealed information to the Lincoln County State
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bank, Duffy assumed the risk of any subsequent disclosure and
could not limit governmental access to that information. Therefore, Lincoln did not breach any duty owing to Duffy when it
supplied information pursuant to a "request" by an investigator
of the of the State of Marshall Securities Commission. Even if it
is found that there is a duty arising from an implied contract of
confidentiality, such a duty is qualified when, as in this case,
there is an overriding duty on the part of the bank to disclose
information in the public interest of effective law enforcement.
And, in view of the policy considerations involved in weighing
the competing interests of an organization's legitimate need for
financial information against an individual's desire of confidentiality in that information, any adoption of a right to financial privacy should be done by the legislature and not the courts.
Even if it is found that there is a duty of confidentiality, the
Appellate Court was incorrect in ruling that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor applies. Duffy's complaint fails to state facts upon
which it can be concluded or even assumed that Lincoln or its
agent or servant was inLexclusive control of the instrumentality 19
which caused the injury complained of. Likewise, the facts and
allegations in the record fail to meet the requirements that there
be facts and circumstances from which one can conclude that
more often than not, an occurrence or accident of the type involved results from a failure to exercise reasonable care by the
party in charge of the instrumentality. Mere assumption by the
Appellate Court judge that in the state of the art of computer
technology an incident such as occurred in this case happens
only by the failure of those in charge to use due care, is not a
valid basis on which to invoke the doctrine, and such a ruling
should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
APPELLEE'S ACTIVITY OF MAINTAINING LARGE
QUANTITIES OF PERSONAL FINANCIAL INFORMATION
IN COMPUTERS IS NOT SUBJECT TO STRICT LIABILITY.

A. Lincoln's activityfalls outside the scope of the doctrine
enunciated in Rylands v. Fletcher and its progeny.
In rejecting the applicability of Rylands strict liability to
Lincoln's activity, the Appellate Court for the State of Marshall
relied on the limitations upon the breadth of the Rylands v.
Fletcher doctrine. In order to better understand these limitations one must consider the origins of this type of strict liability.
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Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affld L.R. 3 H.L. 33
(1868), the seminal case for the application of strict liability to
ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activities, was decided as part of the English Common Law's ongoing efforts to
110provide a system a redress for unlawful-interference with a
landowner's right to the possession and quiet enjoyment of his
land. State of New Jersey DEP v. Ventron, et. al., slip op. (N.J. S.
Ct. July 21, 1983). In Rylands defendant was found liable for
damage done by water escaping into an adjoining landowner's
mine. As with the more traditional causes of action, nuisance
and trespass, liability for the damage was found without any
proof of negligence on the part of the defendant. The Ryland
court's extension of strict liability was based upon an analogy to
the strict liability previously applied for damages caused by
trespassing cattle, dangerous animals and "absolute" nuisances.
Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 78 at 505. The close relationship between the liability imposed in Rylands and the more traditional
causes of action for interference with a landowner's rights indicates that there are definite parameters upon the reach of this
doctrine of strict liability.
This intimate relationship is further illustrated by the difficulty many courts have in distinguishing between them. See
Comment; The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous, or Absolute Nuisance, 1978 Ariz. St. L. J. 99.
Moreover, a few courts, while explicitly rejecting the Rylands
doctrine, nonetheless covertly apply the same principle under
nuisance and trespass theories. Prosser, supra, § 78 at 509. The
connection between these doctrines has led at least one commentator to suggest that Rylands liability should be termed
"strict liability nuisance." See Comment, The Rylands v.
-11 Fletcher Doctrine in America, supra, at 108.1
Advertance to the cases imposing Rylands strict liability reinforces the factual constraints upon the application of this type
of liability, since they invariably involve land usages and conditions which cause physical harm to an innocent party in a close
geographic proximity. See, e.g.; Cities Service Co. v. State, 312
So.2d 799 (Fla. App. 1975) (settling pond for phosphate slimes).
In every one of the previous cases imposing strict liability to
an ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity there have
been the elements of physical damage caused by defendant's
activity to one in close geographic proximity to that activity.
Comment f to § 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that "[f]or an activity to be abnormally dangerous, not only
must it create a danger of physical harm to others, but the danger must be an abnormal one. . ." (emphasis added). The ele-
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ment of physical damage to plaintiff's person or property has
consistently been required by courts before Rylands strict liability is applied. See, e.g., Celebrity Studios,Inc. v. Civetta Excavating, Inc., 72 Misc.2d 1077, 340 NYS2d 694 (1973). In Celebrity
the noise from defendant's construction activity caused the
plaintiff, a tenant in an adjoining building, to sustain substantial
economic harm. Although the court admitted that recovery
would be allowed where such sound waves had caused physical
damage, it refused to extend Rylands strict liability where,
plaintiff's damages were non-physical or "intangible." Id. at
1079-80.
In the present case Duffy does not allege that Lincoln's activity caused him any physical harm; rather, Duffy assertsLeconomic loss and mental and emotional distress. This is 112
not the type of harm which is compensated by courts under the
strict liability doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher. The damages
which would be sustained as a result of Lincoln's activity, if any,
would not be the concrete, physical harm to person or property
which has heretofore justified the imposition of strict liability
under the Rylands doctrine, but a more ethereal, subjective
harm, such as a loss of an element of privacy. The absence of
any physical harm to appellant in the present action should
compel this Court to decline to impose strict liability under the
Rylands doctrine and further indicates the vast factual chasm
between the present cause of action and all the previous causes
which courts have deemed suitable for the imposition of such
strict liability.
The vast majority of cases applying Rylands strict liability
have involved defendant's dangerous and inappropriate use of
land which causes physical harm to an adjoining landowner
through the exercise of natural physical laws. While there has
been some variation from this paradigm over the years, the factual differences have been slight. These variations primarily relate to the location of either plaintiff or defendant's activity. See,
e.g., McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d
635 (1970) (plaintiff harmed while on defendant's land). Nevertheless, these cases all involve a physical harm to the plaintiff
sustained by virtue of his geographicproximity to defendant's
activity. Thus, these cases are significant, not so much for their
variations, as for their consistencies with the paradigm case for
113
the application of Rylands strict liability.±
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash.2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972) is
cited by some scholars as the most maverick case employing the
Rylands doctrine since there the court applied strict liability to
defendant's activity of transporting highly flammable sub-
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stances in large quantities on a public highway. Yet, a closer
look at Siegler evinces no far-reaching expansion of the Rylands
doctrine. Significantly, the storage of such volatile substances
in large quantities had previously been held to be an abnormally
dangerous activity to which strict liability would apply. Yommer
v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A2d 138 (1969). In addition, liability had been imposed for the storage of gasoline where plaintiff
was harmed while on defendant's land. McLane v. Northwest
Natural Gas Co., 255 Ore. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1970). Thus, Siegler
does not signify a departure from the traditional limitations
upon the application of the Rylands doctrine; rather, it represents a gradual extension of such liability to analogous factual
situations closely resembling the instances where such liability
has previously been applied.
Significantly, Siegler involved a physical harm to plaintiff
brought into being by her close geographicconnection to the defendant's activity. Certainly, Siegler cannot be held to justify
the dramatic expansion appellant urges upon this Court in the
present case.
Similar attempts at such a revolutionary expansion of the
doctrine of strict liability first enunciated in Rylands v. Fletcher
have been consistently rejected. See, e.g., Coffey v. Dist. of Okla.
1-14 County, 547 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1976). In Gaston v. _Hunter, 121
Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App. 1978), the court held that strict
liability under §§ 519, 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
would not extend to the use of investigational drugs. In rejecting such an innovative expansion the court declared that,
"[ti he law of abnormally dangerous activities traditionally contemplates a hazardous activity occurring in a specific place
which causes harm to others in some geographic proximity." Id.
at 341.
These cases strongly indicate that there are certain limitations upon the application of the Rylands doctrine of strict liability. The courts continued insistence on the elements of
physical harm to plaintiff and a geographic relationship between
defendant's activity and plaintiff suggests certain factual parameters outside of which strict liability is not justified under this
doctrine. The present case does not involve physical harm to
Duffy caused by Lincoln's activity. Moreover, there is no geographic relationship between Duffy and Lincoln's activity which
allowed the harm to be sustained. The appellant's cause of action implies that strict liability under the Rylands principle is a
doctrine without boundaries, with potential application to every
area of human endeavor. The origins and previous applications
of Rylands strict liability compel a contrary conclusion.
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B. Application of strict liability is not justified under the
originalrule of Rylands v. Fletcher or either the
originalor the revised Restatement of Torts.
Application of strict liability is not justified in the present
case under any of the three available standards. Asithe Appel- 115
late Court for the State of Marshall declared, "[hiowever narrowly construed, the rule of Rylands is not applicable to a
computer user's liability." (R. 14.)
The principle that has emerged from Rylands v. Fletcher
and its progeny is that strict liability will be imposed on a defendant when his activity damages another and is unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is maintained, in
light of the character of that place and its surroundings. See
Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts, 1954, 134-149. Thus,
as the Appellate Court correctly noted, the focus in the inquiry
of whether strict liability is to be applied in this particular case
should not be on the tendency or likelihood of personal financial
information to escape from the place where it is stored; rather,
the emphasis should be on whether Lincoln's activity of maintaining such information is abnormal or inappropriate in character. (R. 14).
Certainly, the use of computers by financial institutions to
store large quanities of information about its customers relating
to their financial transactions with the bank cannot be viewed as
being abnormal or inappropriate to the place where it is maintained. It is not abnormal for Lincoln to store such information
in computers since financial institutions universally rely on
computers to aid them in storing the voluminous and complex
series of transactions that they participate in everyday. A determination of the appropriateness of Lincoln's activity would necessitate an identification of the character of the applicable
surroundings to be considered. Any view of the applicable surroundingslwould seem to reinforce the notion that Lincoln's ac- 116
tivity is an appropriate one, whether one considers geographic
location, relative position in the business community or in the
national community as a whole.
The use of computers in maintaining large quantities of personal financial information about its customers should not be
considered a "non-natural" use of land since it is in no way "exceptional or unusual, considering the locality in which it is carried on." Reter v. Talent IrrigationDistrict, 258 Or. 140, 482 P.2d
170 (1971). A plethora of courts have held that where the challenged activity is a common or typical one in the locale where it
is carried on, Rylands strict liability will not be imposed. See,
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e.g. McKenzie v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 731, 19
Cal. Rptr. 628 (1962) (power line);
The original Restatement of Torts, §§ 519, 520 embraces the
principle of Rylands but limits it to an "ultra-hazardous activity" of the defendant. The emphasis in cases decided under this
standard is on the extreme danger of the challenged activity and
the impossibility of eliminating it with the utmost care, rather
than on the relation of the activity to its surroundings. Prosser,
The Law of Torts § 78 at 512 (4th ed. 1971). In accordance with
this more mechanical test, focusing primarily on the degree to
which an activity is dangerous in an abstract and general sense,
the use of computers to store personal information cannot justify the application of strict liability. There simply is not an extreme danger posed to persons or their property by such an
117 activity. Furthermore,±the small danger that is present could
be eliminated by better engineering, maintainance, programming or other checks on the release of such personal
information.
Sections 519 and 520 of The Restatement (Second) of Torts
revise this test and provide a number of factors to guide courts
in deciding as a matter of law whether Rylands strict liability
should be applied to the challenged activity. Langan v.
Valicopters Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 861, 567 P.2d 218, 221 (1977).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, Comment (f) states
that "several of [the factors] will be required for strict liability."
Some of the factors included in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, § 520 are clearly not present in this case. A key factor,
"the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on," is lacking. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 520(e).
This factor embodies the non-natural limitation added by the
House of Lords in the Rylands decision and therefore prevents
an overly broad application of strict liability. See Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 225, 257 A.2d 138, 141 (1969) (court emphasized that the inappropriateness of the activity was the most
crucial factor). In Dye v. Burdick, 262 Ark. 124, 140, 553 S.W.2d
833, 840 (1977), the court refused to apply strict liability since-the
dam which burst was not inappropriate to its location.
In Cairl v. City of St. Paul 268 N.W. 2d 908 (Minn. 1978), the
court refused to apply strict liability to high-speed chases by
city police, since such an activity is not unusual or inappropriate
118 in a metropolitan area. This line oficases illustrates the underlying idea that strict liability applies only where activity is "out
of place" such that "victims are particularly helpless in the face
of danger against which they cannot, and should not be expected to take adequate precautions, and yet which may cause
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them overwhelming loss." Reynolds, Strict Tort Liability: Has
Abnormal DangerBecome a Fact?,34 Okla. L.R. 76, 82 (1981). In
the present case, Duffy was free to forgo banking with Lincoln in
order to avoid the risk that the computer would divulge any information. See Gaston v. Hunter 121 Ariz. 33, 48, 588 P.2d 326, 341
(Ariz. App. 1978) ("one who voluntarily encounters the dangerous activity, or is a participant in it, may not recover").
Another factor which is not present in this case is "the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520(d). The Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 520, Comment (i) states that an activity is
"a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the
great mass of mankind or by many people in the community."
Where an activity is a common one, courts have held that strict
liability is inapplicable. See Chicago & North Western Railway
Co. v. Tyler, 482 F.2d 1007, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 1973) (soil conservation dams in universal use, therefore no strict liability). It is
reasonable to expect that most people have information concerning them stored in at least one computer. See Countryman,
The DiminishingRight of Privacy: The PersonalDossierand the
Computer, 49 Tex. L.R. 837, 838 (1971) (hereinafter "Personal
Dossier"). Computers have become aLdaily fact of life in to- 119
day's society and their use in processing all types of information, including bank records, cannot be characterized as
uncommon.
Along with the common use of computers has come a common understanding that computers, although highly efficient,
are no more infallible than are the humans who construct and
program them. This is significant in determining whether a
computer malfunction, like the error in this case, constitutes an
abnormal danger, since the "usual dangers resulting from an activity are not regarded as abnormal." Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 520, Comment (i). The "usual dangers" associated with
computerized information processing include unauthorized disclosure of information either by active penetration of the system
or by the kind of inadvertent error which occurred in this case.
See Personal Dossier, at 863. Hence, the common use of computers for information processing militates against a finding that
such an activity is abnormally dangerous.
Factor (f) of the Restatment (Second) of Torts, § 520 (1977)
requires a weighing of the value of the activity to the community
against "its dangerous attributes." Computers have become invaluable tools in almost all aspects of modern society and the
many advantages provided by their use - including quicker and

The John Marshall Law Review

less costly information management tial danger involved.

[Vol. 17:989

far outweigh any poten-

Under factor (c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 520, the "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care" must be considered. Where it is possible to elimi120 nate the risk of harm, courts have held that the activityLcannot
be deemed abnormally dangerous. See Fleege v. Cimpl, 305 N.W.
2d 409 (S.D. 1981) (pump in water which electrocuted swimmer
could have been made safe, held, not abnormally dangerous and
strict liability did not apply). In the present case proper computer engineering, programming or maintenance could have
prevented the malfunction.
Comment (m) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 520,
states that "when safety cannot be attained by the exercise of
due care, there is reason to regard the danger as an abnormal
one." Conversely here, where the danger can be avoided, it cannot be characterized as abnormal.
The remaining two factors from § 520 require a consideration of whether there exists a high degree of risk of harm and
the likelihood that the harm will be great. Comment (g) to § 520
requires the harm to be "major in degree" and states that "it is
not enough that there is a recognizable risk of some relatively
slight harm. .."
The harm which can be considered is limited to that harm
which is foreseeable. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d
908, 921 (10th Cir. 1981). The "foreseeable orbit of harm" limits
the extent of liability which can arise from an activity found to
be ultra-hazardous. Mazza v. Berlanti, 206 Pa. Super. 505, 508,
214 A.2d 257, 259 (1965). It is not foreseeable that the inadvertent
disclosure of one's banking records to an investigating state
agency would ultimately result in the cancellation of one's line
of credit. Although such a disclosure may compromise a customer's privacy interests, the likelihood of serious harm result121ing therefrom is minimal.iMoreover, the'probabiity of such a
disclosure taking place is not "major in degree". Rather, there
exists only a slight chance that personal financial information
will be accidentally disclosed and only a slight chance that such
a disclosure will result in any serious harm. Although it is possible that serious harm could result to the customer, the likelihood of this occurring is not sufficient to create an abnormal
danger which would justify the application of strict liability in
this case.
Hence, evaluation of the six factors required by section 520
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reveals that none are present in this case and that, therefore, there exists no abnormal
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danger in Lincoln's use of a computer to process customer information. Accordingly, strict liability in tort under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 cannot be applied.
C. Important public policy considerationsstrongly
militate against the imposition of strict liability.
A balancing of the relevant social, political, economic and
legal factors compels the conclusion that justice requires that
Lincoln's activity not be subject to judicially imposed strict liability. If such liability is imposed on computer maintenance of
personal financial information, it would make all entities such as
the appellee insurers and impose upon them a burden which is
beyond their capacity to bear. The use of computers in maintaining such information is practiced not only by large financial
institutions but also by small Savings and Loans, already
threatened with the specter of bankruptcy due to other economic pressures. In addition, many small businessesland nu-±122
merous non-profit organizations such as hospitals and schools
use computers in a similar fashion. To apply strict liability to
such activities would, as the Appellate Court pointed out, impose an "unreasonable burden on record-keepers." (R. 15). In
Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 239 N.W.2d 190, 194
(1976), the court rejected Rylands strict liability to the maintenance of electrical wires because of the "severe economic consequences which may be sustained by the many small electric
utilities in the state by the abrupt imposition of such a rule."
The court indicated that if such liability were to be imposed it
should be done by the legislature which is "better equipped to
resolve economic problems of this nature." Id.; See also, Wirth
v. Mayrath Industries,Inc., 278 N.W.2d 789, 793 (N.D. 1979).
Moreover, the computer use challenged here is a socially
beneficial activity which is of prime importance to advances in
our domestic economy and competitiveness in global marketplaces. Imposition of strict liability on so vital an activity would
have a pronounced "chilling effect" on the use of computer
technology.
Where the challenged activity is similarly necessary and
valuable to society, courts have generally refused to apply Rylands strict liability to it. Thus, earlier American courts refused
to apply strict liability to dangerous enterprises where they
were indispensable to the commercial and industrial growth of
the country. See, e.g., Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221
(Tex. 1936). Although the vitality of this rationale lessened with
the development of the country'slresources, it retains its force ±23
in appropriate circumstances. Thus, courts have consistently
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rejected strict liability's application to electric companies because of both the necessity and great value of electrical power to
our society. Hernandez v. George E. Failings Co., 642 P.2d 749
(Wash. App. 1981); Wirth v. Mayrath Industries, Inc. 278 N.W.
789, 794 (N.D. 1979). Computers already occupy, or soon will, a
similar critical and essential place in our society. Thus, strict
liability should not be imposed in the present case both because
of the unreasonable burden it would put on such computer activity and because the tremendous benefits computers confer on
our society outweigh any advantage to be gained by the application of strict liability.
Furthermore, strict liability should be applied by courts
only to the most hazardous activities. Dickens v. United States,
378 F. Supp. 845, 854 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.
1977). The maintenance of personal financial information in
computers does not have a bad safety record or seem to pose
exceptional risks of serious harm so as to justify the application
of strict liability. Appellant proposes nearly unlimited liability
without fault for any activity and for every extreme harm that
activity may cause. This court should reject such a quantum
leap in judicially imposed strict liability and restrict application
of Rylands-like liability to only the most dangerous activities.
The evaluation of the harms caused by different enterprises and
the balancing of other relevant economic consequences is more
the function of the legislature which is much better suited to
124 such policyiresolutions. See, e.g. S.C. Code § 2-6 (1962) (strict
liability for ground damage caused by aviation).
There are also numerous aspects of the present case which
compel the conclusion that Rylands strict liability should not be
imposed on Lincoln's activity. In every instance, such liability is
predicated on the inevitability of the risk in the challenged activity, that is, the inability to eliminate, even by the exercise of utmost care, a substantial element of danger. See Nicholai v. Day,
264 Or. 354, 506 P.2d 483 (1973) (strict liability not applied because the risks could be controlled by the exercise of reasonable
caution). Yet, in the present case it seems clear that it is possible to eliminate a substantial element of danger in appellee's activity by the exercise of the utmost care. In Arizona State
Highway Department v. Bechtold, 105 Ariz. 125, 460 P.2d 179
(1969), where a faulty "electronic computer-type control" used
in traffic signals at an intersection malfunctioned, the court held
that the plaintiff would have to show that the computerprogrammer failed to use due care in creating and copying the
program. Id. at 128, 460 P.2d at 182. The court ultimately held for
the plaintiff-motorist, based not on strict liability, but on the
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negligence of the highway department in not having any form of
preventive maintainence of signals.
Similarly, the present cause of action alleges a computer error which presumably was caused by a failure of someone to use
due care in either the design, programming or maintainence of
the computer. Thus, the present case is not a suitable one for
the imposition of strict liability since theicomputer malfunction 125
allegedly causing Duffy's injuries could have been eliminated by
the exercise of reasonable care, and, therefore, appellee should
be required to demonstrate that it was Lincoln's conduct that
fell below the standard of care required of it and thereby caused
his harm.

In addition, the activity of computer maintainence of large
quantities of personal financial information poses none of the
evidentiary problems for establishing the defendant's negligence which usually justify the imposition of strict liability. See,
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972). No
evidence of negligence is destroyed or lost as part of the malfunction causing appellee's harm. An engineering, programming or maintainence error causing such a malfunction can be
identified just as readily after the malfunction as before. Moreover, if the malfunction is brought about by an incorrect computer instruction, evidence of this is preserved too, as it was in
the present case. See R. 2.
Furthermore, strict liability should not be applied in the
present case because Duffy was a voluntary customer of the
bank and had reason to know of such risks. Rylands strict liability is extended only in favor of members of the public who are
involuntarily exposed to danger, not persons entering the premises, participating in the activity or having reason to know of the
risk.
Strict liability also does not extend to the present case since
the alleged harm was brought about by the Commission's investigation into Duffy's acquisition of a public corporation. Where
such harm is caused by the intervening,± intentional act of a126
third party, strict liability should not be imposed.
II.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
A BANK SHOULD BE UNDER A DUTY TO KEEP
FINANCIAL INFORMATION ABOUT ITS
CUSTOMERS IN CONFIDENCE.

Appellant, William Duffy, brought a complaint against the
appellee, Lincoln County State Bank Corporation (Lincoln) alleging negligent disclosure of personal information arising out of
the furnishing of information by Lincoln to the State of Marshall
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Securities Commission. Heretofore there has been no statutory
law in the State of Marshall prohibiting or regulating the furnishing of information on customers' accounts by banks nor defining or protecting the "right of privacy" claimed by appellant.
Nonetheless, in ruling on the propriety of the Circuit Court's denial of Lincoln's motion to dismiss, the Appellate Court held
that "a record-keeper, such as a bank, has a duty to its customers to act with care regarding the maintenance of sensitive personal financial information about them" and that "[c]ustomers
expect their bank to hold information about them in confidence,
and to disclose it only with the customer's consent or for a legally justified reason." (R. 15). The appeal of that ruling now
presents this court with the novel question of the existence and
scope of a bank's duty of confidentiality concerning the affairs of
its customers. A review of the various theories on which a right
to confidentiality or privacy in financial records is founded as
well as the cases and commentaries to have dealt with the issue
127reveals that absent legislative enactment, there shouldiLbe no
duty on the part of a bank to keep financial information about its
customers in confidence.
A.

There is no duty arisingfrom any common law
invasion of privacy theory.

The tort doctrine of a right to privacy is based on the right of
an individual to be let alone, to be free from unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which they are not necessarily concerned. Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Manufacturing Co., 415
S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1967). This protection extends only to "the privacy of private life and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a man's life has ceased to be private ... the protection
is withdrawn." S. Warren and L. Brandeis. "The Right of Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) cited in Hollanderv. Lubow,
277 Md. 47, 351 A. 2d 421, cert. denied 426 v.s. 936 (1976). As to
invasion of privacy arising from disclosure of private facts, there
must be public disclosure. See, W. Prosser, "Privacy," 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383; Petersonv. Idaho FirstNational Bank, 83 Idaho
578, 367 P. 2d 284 (1961); Rush v. Maine Savings Bank, 387 A. 2d
1127 (Me. 1978).
Since financial records such as copies of checks and deposit
slips relating to a checking account are not confidential communications, but are instruments of commercial trade which must
necessarily be exposed to numerous persons in the ordinary
course of business, there is no privacy interest to be protected
against voluntary disclosure. See, e.g., Adams v. Trust Co. Bank,
145 Ga. App. 702, 244 S. E. 651 (1978). And since Duffy makes no
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claim that the disclosure of information 1contained in his ac- ±28
count was made public but, instead was disclosed only to an investigation of the State of Marshall Securities Commission,
Duffy fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on
the ground of invasion of privacy.
B.

There is no duty arisingfrom any implied contract of
confidentiality.

There is authority to the effect that a bank customer has a
property right in the information contained in the records of accounts, deposits and withdrawals kept by a bank and, therefore,
a bank is under an implied obligation not to disclose such confidential financial information without the customer's consent.
See, e.g., Petersonv. Idaho FirstNat. Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d
284, 92 A.L.R.2d 891 (1961); Milohnich v. FirstNat. Bank of Miami
Springs, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. App. 1969); Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34
(N.J. 1929).
On the other hand, there are those cases which hold that
there is no implied agreement of confidentiality and that a bank
customer has no proprietary interest in bank records. These
cases state that bank records are the property of the bank and
the most a depositor can claim is that the information they contain shall not be disclosed for the deliberate purpose of inflicting
substantial injuries upon him. See, e.g. Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F.2d
930 (D. Mass. 1928); Peters v. Sjoholm, 25 Wash. App. 39, 604 P.2d
527 (1979), affd 95 Wash.2d 871, 631 P.2d 937 (1981).
Those cases to have found a duty often cite Tournier v. National ProvincialBank, 1 K.B. 461 (1924) as the "locus classicus"
of the bank's duty of secrecy as regards its±customers affairs. 129
I.F.G. Baxter, THE LAW OF BANKING 21-2 (2d ed. 1968) cited in
Milohnich v. FirstNat. Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So.2d at 761.
Tournier teaches:
The duty is not absolute and its qualifications can be
classified under four headings. These are:
(a) a disclosure under compulsion of law,
(b) where there is a duty to the public to disclose,
(c) where the interests of the bank require disclosure,
(d) where the disclosure is made with the express or
implied consent of the customer.
Baxter, supra, cited in Milohnich, 224 So.2d at 761 (emphasis added). Accord 7 Am. Jur. "Banks," § 196, cited in Peterson v.
Idaho FirstNational Bank, 367 P.2d at 290.
In United States v. First National Bank of Mobile, 67 F.
Supp. 616, at 624 (S.D. Ala. 1946), it was said: "All agree that a
bank should protect its business records from the prying eyes of
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the public, moved by curiosity or malice . . ." But where, as
here, the request for disclosure came from a valid investigation
of the State of Marshall Securities Commission, these are circumstances which give rise to a public duty of disclosure as referred to above. Indeed, there may be a "moral duty of banks to
the community in which they do business to use reasonable care
in seeing that their depositors are not committing a fraud upon
the public." Cunningham v. Merchant's Nat. Bank, 4 F.2d 25, 29,
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 691 (1925). Lincoln would be liable only of it acted unnecessarily, promiscuously or maliciously
±30 in disclosing the Ibank records of its customers. See State v. McCray, 15 Wash. App. 810, 551 P.2d 1376 (1976). As a matter of law
it can be said that Lincoln acted reasonably under the circumstances in disclosing information to an investigator of the Securities Commission. Thus, to the extent that Duffy's complaint is
based on any duty arising from an implied agreement of confidentiality, it should be dismissed. Even assuming arguendo
that Duffy did have a right of confidentiality in the bank records,
"[b]alanced against the individual's right to privacy.., is the
public's interest in effective law enforcement, which in a proper
case can justify certain kinds of warrantless intrusions on an individual's privacy." Id., 551 P.2d at 1379. This is such a case.
Some courts to have addressed the balancing of a party's
right to discover relevant facts against the right of a bank customer to maintain reasonable privacy have reached a compromise by requiring that the customer be given notice of the
request for information. See, e.g. Valley Bk. of Nev. v. Superior
Ct. of San Joaquin County, 15 Cal.3d 652, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 542
P.2d 977 (1975). This, however, is not a case where such a policy
of notice should be implemented. The kind of investigation pursued by the Commission in this case is often the type which is
carried on discretely in order that the investigated party is not
put on notice and given an opportunity to "cover his tracks."
The work and investigations of agencies such as the Securities
Commission would be virtually frustrated by requiring that notice be given when, in the public interest, such agency has re131quested account information on a bank customer.±
The conclusion that there is no duty on the part of a bank
arising from any implied agreement of confidentiality is supported by a decision of the United States Supreme Court and
numerous state (and federal) courts to have applied its reasoning. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), although the
Court recognized the sensitive nature of a banking customer's
financial records, it concluded that since the records are the
property of the financial institution, the customer has no recog-
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nizable privacy interest in them and therefore no Constitutional
claim. 425 U.S. at 440-41. A closer look at the Miller and later
cases will show that the Appellate Court erred in concluding
that a bank should be under a duty to keep financial information
about its customers in strict confidence.
C.

There is no constitutionally protected right to financial
privacy: United States v. Miller.

The formulation of a right to privacy as a constitutional
guarantee will not avail an individual's claim to financial privacy
in records kept by a bank. In United States v. Miller, the United
States Supreme Court held squarely in a 7-2 decision that the
records kept by a bank are not the depositor's private papers,
but instead are the business records of the bank. The court
went on to state that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the information kept in such bank records and that,
therefore, the bank's compliance with a subpoena for the
records from a government investigative agency did not violate
the depositor's Fourth Amendment rights. Miller, 425 U.S. at
440-41. Quoting its decision in California Bankers Assn. v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 at 48-49 (1974), the Miller Courtireiterated, 132
"[bIanks are ... not.., neutrals in transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties to the instruments with a substantial stake in their continued availability and acceptance."
Id.
The statements made by the Miller Court in elaborating on
its decision and in denying the respondent depositor's claims
are particularly pertinent to the privacy or confidentiality claim
of Duffy in the instant case. The court stated:
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment interest in the
records kept by the banks because they are merely copies of personal records that were made available to the banks for a limited
purpose and in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
He relies on this Court's statement in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967), quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967), that "we have . . . departed from the narrow view" that
"property interests control the right of the Government to search
and seize,'" and that a "search and seizure" become unreasonable
when the Government's activities violate "the privacy upon which
[a person] justifiably relie [s]." But in Katz the Court stressed that
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 389 U.S., at 351 ....
Even... the original checks... are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial
statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:989

privacy concerning the information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records to be maintained
because they "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax,
and regulatory investigations and proceedings." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1829b(a) (1) .

.

. The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his af-

fairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government ... This Court has held repeatedly that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed
in the third party will not be betrayed. (citations omitted).
133 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-443.1
D. Miller teaches that there is no duty of confidentiality
on the part of banks.
Since, in the instant case, Duffy does not look to the United
States Constitution as the source of his right to confidentiality
but his claim on state tort law grounds, the following commentator's observations are pertinent:
State judges, however, need not ignore the reasoning
of the United States Supreme Court in opinions rejecting a comparable federal constitutional claim. For
a state court ...

,

opinions of the United States

Supreme Court are like opinions of sister state courts
or lower federal courts. While neither binding in a constitutional sense nor precedential in a jurisprudential
one, they are entitled to whatever weight their reasoning and intellectual persuasiveness warrant.
Falk, "The State Constitution: A More Than 'Adequate'
Nonfederal Ground", 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 283-84 (1973).
What the "reasoning and intellectual persuasiveness" of the
Miller decision should tell this court is that any expectation of
privacy or confidentiality which a customer, such as Duffy, has
in his bank records is forfeited when he discloses the information to a third party, in this case, the bank in the course of his
bank transactions. Any checks, financial statements and deposit
slips contain information voluntarily given to the bank and are
the business records of the bank and not the private papers or
property of the customer. Having revealed information to the
Lincoln County State Bank, Duffy assumed the risk of any subsequent disclosure and could not limit governmental, i.e. the
State of Marshall Securities Commission's access to that information. Therefore, Lincoln did not breach any duty owing to
Duffy not only, as the Appellate Court held, when it complied
134 with the subpoena ofiJune 6, 1981 but also when it supplied in-

formation pursuant to an April 11, 1981 "request" by the Com-
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mission's chief investigator, Nancy Barnes. (R. 2). This view is
supported by the decisions of several courts to have adopted the
Miller reasoning and have held that since there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy with respect to bank records then it
makes no difference whether any legal process is obtained for
the purpose of obtaining the records. The permission of the
bank to search its records is deemed adequate for police officers
or investigators to obtain them. See, e.g., United States v. Poole,
557 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1977); Fitzgerald v. State, 599 P.2d 572
(Wyo. 1979); Adams v. Trust Co. Bank, 145 Ga. App. 702, 244
S.E.2d 651 (1978); Reporters Committeefor Freedom of the Press
v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 593 F.2d 1030 (C.A.D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 949 (1979).
Since Miller, a number of state courts have adopted the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court that a bank
customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy or confidentiality in bank records. See, e.g., Adams v. Trust Co. Bank, 145 Ga.
App. 702, 244 S.E.2d 651 (1978) (trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to bank on invasion of privacy issue
since bank owed depositor no duty to refrain from disclosing
checks and deposit records to depositor's employer); Fitzgerald
v. State, 599 P.2d 572 (Wyo. 1979) (police officers who obtained
defendant's bank records on a voluntary basis from bank without legal process had not engaged in an unlawful search and
seizure); Peters v. Sjoholm, 604 P.2d 527 (Wash. App. 1979), affid
95 Wash. 2d 871, 631 P.2d 937 (1981) (no-lviolation of federal or1L35
state constitutional right of freedom from unreasonable search
and seizure by seizure of bank account to pay state tax
delinquency).
E.

Contrary to the holding in Burrows v. Superior Court
and its progeny, there is no valid basis to adopt a
duty of confidentiality.

In 1974 the California Supreme Court in Burrows v. Superior
Court, 13 Cal.3d 238, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590, while acknowledging the Miller decision, held under a state constitutional provision that a bank customer has a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to financial information disclosed to a bank, and that it was improper for the bank to release
such information to third party investigators, at least in the absence of a subpoena or other appropriate legal compulsion.
Since 1974 there have been many cases to have followed the Burrows holding. See, e.g. Doyle v. State Bar of California,32 Cal.3d
12, 184 Cal. Rptr. 720, 648 P.2d 942 (1982); Suburban Trust Co. v.
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Waller, 44 Md. 335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979); Charnes v. DiGiacomo,
200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980).
In view of the vast difference between the decisions in these
cases and that of the Miller line, a review of the reasoning in
Burrows is therefore appropriate.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the bank customer's
right to financial privacy found in Burrows and many cases following Burrows was said to have been constitutionally founded
from various provisions of state constitutions. See, e.g., Valley
Bk. of Nev. v. Superior Ct. of San Joaquin County, 15 Cal.3d 652,
125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d 977 (1975); Com. v. DeJohn; Charnes v.
136 DiGiacomo. Absent comparable provisions inithe State of
Marshall Constitution, Burrows should be of little persuasion to
this court. But for reasons beyond this superficial rebuttal - for
reasons which reach into the heart of the Burrows reasoning,
the Burrows decision reveals no valid basis for a duty of confidentiality to be adopted in the State of Marshall.
1. A bank customer's reasonable expectation: Among the concerns of the California Supreme Court was that "If or all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals ... of their financial
affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible
to participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account, "Burrows, 529 P.2d at 596, and
that a bank customer's reasonable expectation in making such
disclosure is that "absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for
internal banking purposes." Id. at 593. Conversely, however, it
has been said:
"Every individual must from time to time reach beyond his private enclave, draw other people into his activities, and expose his activities to public view. In any
normal life, even in pursuing his most private purposes, the individual must occasionally transact business with other people. When he does so, he leaves
behind, as evidence of his activity, the records and
recollections of others. He cannot expect that these activities are his private affair. To the extent an individual knowingly exposes his activities to third parties,
...
if the Government is subsequently called upon to
investigate his activities for possible violations of the
law, it is free to seek out these third parties, to inspect
their records, and to probe their recollections for
evidence."
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S.
137949 (1979). And, in discussing a customers 1expectations as to
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his bank records, the court in State ex rel. Dorganv. Union State
Bank, 267 N.W.2d 777 (N.D. 1978) held that bank records are not
the private property of a depositor but the business records of
the bank and that this is not changed merely because a depositor expects that the records are his private papers. That fact
was not changed even when a depositor gave specific written notice to the bank that he considered the records to be his private
papers not subject to disclosure absent consent of the depositor.
Having knowingly disclosed information to Lincoln, which
information became a part of Lincoln's business records, Duffy
has no cause to complain because Lincoln subsequently disclosed its records to the Securities Commission.
2. The bank is not a neutralentity: The Burrows court took the
position as to records regarding a customer's account that the
bank was a neutral entity with no significant interest in them.
529 P.2d at 594. Burrows, however, did acknowledge that "if the
bank is not neutral, as for example where it is itself a victim of
the defendant's suspected wrongdoing, the depositor's right of
privacy will not prevail." Id. An example of such victimization
might be where a defendant was passing bad checks.
The Burrows court is wrong in concluding that as to the financial records of a customer that the bank is a neutral entity.
To begin with, these financial records are not the private property of the customer but are part of the business records of the
bank by which a bank conducts its day to day affairs. It has
been said that "[ciopies of checks and depositislips relating to 138
a checking account are not confidential communications but are
instruments of commercial trade which must necessarily be exposed to numerous persons in the ordinary course of business.
Adams v. Trust Co. Bank, 145 Ga. App. at, 244 S.E.2d at 653. And,
as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court, banks are
not mere bystanders in transactions involving negotiable instruments but have a substantial stake in their availability and acceptance and also are the most easily identifiable party to the
instruments. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. at 4849; United States v. Miller, 385 U.S. at 440-41.
Therefore, Duffy had no expectation of confidentiality with
respect to the records of the bank and Lincoln, as an interested
party, was at liberty to disclose any account information in response to even the informal request of the investigators of the
Securities Commission.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:989

F. Any adoption of a right to financialprivacy should be
done by the legislature.
The primary protection afforded an individual's right to financial privacy should come from the legislature and not the
courts. The legislature is the proper body to weigh all the factors in the delicate balance between an organization's legitimate
need for financial information and an individual's desire to be
free from unfair intrusions into his private life. In response to
this need many states have legislated to regulate the information activities of nongovernmental organizations in recent years.
See Comment: "The Use and Abuse of Computerized Informa139tion: Striking a Balance BetweenLPersonal Privacy Interests
and Organizational Information Needs," 44 ALB. L. REV. 589,
602-610 (1980). "Resolution of personal privacy issues must address the needs of business information-processing, while attempting to provide the maximum feasible protection for the
individual." Id. at 608. "A statutory approach would provide
both certainty and a clear legal basis from which individual and
organizational rights and obligations could be determined." Id.
at 610.
As was once eloquently expressed:
Because the Court is without power to shape measures
for dealing with the problems of society but has merely
the power of negation over measures shaped by others,
the indispensable judicial requisite is intellectual
humility .... Matters of policy . . . are by definition
matters which demand the resolution of conflicts of
value, and the elements of conflicting values are
largely imponderable. Assessment of their competing
worth involves differences of feeling; it is also an exercise in prophecy. Obviously the proper forum for mediating a clash of feelings and rendering a prophetic
judgment is the body chosen for those purposes by the
people. Its functions can be assumed by this Court
only in disregard of the historic limits of the
Constitution.
A.F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 553-57
(1979) (J. Frank further concurring).
III.

Even ifit is found that there is a duty of confidentiality,
the Appellate Court was incorrect in ruling that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies.

It is the claim, inter alia, of Lincoln that no facts indicating
its negligence were alleged in Duffy's complaint. The Appellate
Court ruled, however, that "due to the state of the art of computer technology and the difficulty of proving a breach under
such circumstances, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor should ap-
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ply to establish the negligent disclosure of personal information
through a computer." (R.16). The Appellate Court went on to
hold that, thus, Duffy's complaintLis sufficient to withstand a 140
motion to dismiss if it alleges that Lincoln "had control over the
instrumentality of the disclosure, the computer, and that this
disclosure would not have happened but for" Lincoln's negligence. Id. The Appellate Court was wrong in that the evidence
upon the instant record is not sufficient to give rise to an inference of negligence so as to allow or permit the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.
Courts applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor generally
require that the plaintiff must establish three things with regard
to the event resulting in his injury before he can submit his
claim to the jury: (1) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (2) it
must be such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not occur
if the one having such control uses proper case; and (3) it must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166
(Minn. 1980).
There is no problem with the third criterion of these requirements since there is no allegation that Duffy was in any
way involved with the computer search. However, as to the
"control" element stated in criterion one as well as two, the Appellate Court was incorrect in assuming that the instrumentality
which allegedly caused the injury was within Lincoln's exclusive control. In fact, the court's focus in assuming that the computer was the instrumentality may also be improper.
It has been agreed that the search request entered into the
computer used by Lincoln was correct. (R. 16). However, in
spite of a search request merely for identification
typeLinformation (i.e., name, address, account number and ac- 141
count type), the computer print-out revealed all of Duffy's personal account transactions from January 15, 1981 to April 15,
1981. (R. 2). Such an unrequested print-out could have been
caused by an error or "bug" in the computer program itself or by
a malfunction due to improper maintenance or manufacture of
the computer. Although it is alleged that Lincoln "uses" a computer, (R 1&3), there is no allegation as to ownership and/or
maintenance of the computer, or as to who wrote or maintains
the program. Where there are two or more persons or causes
which might have produced an injury and some, but not all, are
under the control of a defendant, a plaintiff must exclude the
operation of those causes for which the defendant is under no
legal obligation, before the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies.
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Charlton v. Lovelance, 351 Mo. 364, 173 S.W.2d 13 (1943). This
Duffy has not done.
Duffy's complaint fails to state facts upon which it can be
concluded or even assumed that Lincoln or its agent or servant
was the programmer, or the maintainer of the computer program, or the maintainer of the computer. "If it would be sheer
speculation to conclude that the cause of the accident was one
within the defendant's exclusive control, a case within the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor" has not been made out. Taylor v.
Crane Rental Co., 103 App. D.C. 13, 254 F.2d 350 (1958). See also J
& Jay,Inc. v. E. Perry Iron & Metal Co., 161 Me. 229, 210 A.2d 462
(1965) (holding that it is sufficient that the jury properly could
have excluded the negligence of others than the defendant from
142the cause of the accident.) I
Even if it is found that Lincoln was in exclusive control of
the instrumentality, the Appellate Court was incorrect in ruling
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor should apply in this case
because of the state of the art of computer technology and the
difficulty of proving a breach. The proper application for the
doctrine is to be determined by judges applying "their common
experience of life" to the event giving rise to the suit and deciding whether the occurrence resulting in injury is such that, in
the ordinary course of things, does not happen if those in charge
use due care. See Strick v. Stutsmans, 633 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App.
1982). No presumption of negligence is to be drawn from the
mere fact of an accident and resulting injury. It is the character
or nature of the accident, rather than the fact of the accident,
which determines the application of the doctrine. Id. It cannot
be merely assumed by a judge that in the state of the art of computer technology, an incident such as occurred in this case happens only if those in charge fail to use due care.
In sum, the facts and allegations in the record fail to meet
the requirements that there be facts and circumstances from
which one can conclude that more often than not, an occurrence
or accident of the type involved results from a failure to exercise
reasonable care by the party in charge of the instrumentality.
The Appellate Court was incorrect in holding that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor should apply in this case and such ruling
±43 should be reversed.±
CONCLUSION
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, it is respectfully
submitted:
1. That this Court should affirm the judgment of the court below insofar as it granted Lincoln's motion to dismiss and

19841

Computer User's Liability for Improper Disclosure

1105

held that the rule of strict liability first applied in Rylands v.
Fletcher is not applicable to Lincoln's use of a computer to
process personal financial information.
2. That this Court should affirm the judgment of the court below insofar as it granted Lincoln's motion to dismiss and
held that the maintenance of personal financial information
in a computer is not an ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity.
3. That this Court should reverse the judgment of the court below as held that a record-keeper, such as a bank, has a duty
to its customers to act with care regarding the maintenance
of personal financial information about them and, instead,
hold that a bank is under no such duty.
4. In the alternative, should this Court hold that a duty of confidentiality did exist, that this Court should rule that Lincoln,
as a matter of law, did not breach any duty to prevent disclosure of confidential information in view of the overriding
duty of disclosure based on the public's interest in effective
law enforcement.
5. That this Court should reverse the judgment of the court below as held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies in
establishing the negligence of Lincoln and, instead, hold that
this doctrine does not apply.1
144
6. That this Court should reverse the holding of the court insofar as it denied Lincoln's motion to dismiss and should,
therefore, grant the notion to dismiss and rule that Duffy has
failed to state a cause of action for negligent disclosure of
financial information.I
±45
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Appellee
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